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An Analysis of the Relationship Between Employment and Crime
Abstract
The relationship between aggregate unemployment rates and the incidence of crime has been frequently
analyzed (Cantor and Land, 1985; Bennett, 1991; Bushway, 2011). However, the result of this analysis has
been inconsistent. This discrepancy could be related to the inconsistent application of both economic and
sociological theory, as well as several methodological issues with previous research and literature (Bennett,
1991). Becker’s 1968 paper describes crime as an individual decision made based on potential loss and gain.
However, many prior analyses examine aggregate data, masking changes in individuals’ situations behind
aggregate numbers.
The importance of predicting crime for law enforcement and public policy can have a large significance and
magnitude on informed decisions. This can both reduce the cost of law enforcement and increase the
efficiency of anti-crime measures.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol21/iss1/16
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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between aggregate 
unemployment rates and the incidence of crime has 
been frequently analyzed (Cantor and Land, 1985; 
Bennett, 1991; Bushway, 2011). However, the result 
of this analysis has been inconsistent. This discrepancy 
could be related to the inconsistent application of 
both economic and sociological theory, as well as 
several methodological issues with previous research 
and literature (Bennett, 1991). Becker’s 1968 paper 
describes crime as an individual decision made based 
on potential loss and gain. However, many prior analyses 
examine aggregate data, masking changes in individuals’ 
situations behind aggregate numbers.
The importance of predicting crime for 
law enforcement and public policy can have a large 
significance and magnitude on informed decisions. 
This can both reduce the cost of law enforcement and 
increase the efficiency of anti-crime measures.
Potential criminals include their own situations 
in their decision-making processes. In order to examine 
how changes in situation affect changes in crime rates, 
it is necessary to look at time series data to see the 
subject’s response to changes. The longitudinal nature of 
time series analysis also allows for comparison between 
individuals. As a result, it is possible to make general 
statements about responses to economic conditions.
NLSY97 data was examined to see whether 
employment variables predict crime, with employment 
represented by both income and the number of weeks 
worked. Theory predicts that there are lagged effects of 
employment on crime, which is why both lagged and 
unlagged cases are examined. In order to validate the 
assumption that changes in employment cause changes 
in crime, rather than the other way around, the impact 
of lagged crime on employment variables is also tested. 
Employment is found to have a significant effect on 
crime, although the theory fails to explain the lagged 
effects of employment measures.
II. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
Many of the economic theories of criminal 
activity draw from Becker’s 1968 paper, analyzing crime 
as the result of rational choice. In his model, individuals 
consider the expected benefit of crime, taking into 
account the chance of success and the possible 
monetary gain. If the expected benefit is greater than 
the expected cost, which takes into account the chance 
of failure and the cost of being punished, the individual 
will commit a crime.
The expected benefit of crime depends on a 
variety of factors. For crimes such as theft or burglary, 
there is usually a clear monetary gain. However, the utility 
gained from many types of violent crime, including rape 
and murder, is usually not measurable. The expected 
benefit of crime should also depend on income and 
wealth; money has diminishing marginal effects on 
utility, so people with higher wealth or income benefit 
comparatively less from the same amount of capital.
The costs of crime offer a more direct 
relationship between employment status and crime. In 
general, the cost of crime is its punishment and depends 
on the chance of being caught. The costs include any 
fines for the crime and the opportunity cost incurred 
by imprisonment. While in jail, a person cannot earn 
the wages they would have earned if not in jail. There 
may also be a loss in future wages. With a conviction 
on record, it is harder to find higher paying jobs, which 
means that past crimes can lead to lost wages well 
into the future (Barak, 2009). Often included in other 
studies is a measurement of the utility gained by being 
honest or the cost of being dishonest. Many individuals 
associate immorality with crime, and incur a “moral 
cost” by committing a crime (Bourguignon, 2003).
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If unemployed, a person earns no wages, and so 
loses no wages if in jail. This decreases the opportunity 
cost of committing crime. Additionally, if a person’s 
wealth decreases while unemployed, the same financial 
benefit from a crime will have greater relative value. 
Both effects lead to a higher chance of committing 
crime.
Cohen and Felson (1979) predict additional 
effects on crime from unemployment. They base 
their theory around the idea that individuals tend to 
fall into routines. According to them, individuals who 
have fallen into routines while employed tend to stay 
in their routines immediately after losing employment. 
According to the routine activities theory, routines take 
a certain amount of time to change. Instead of changing 
their habits, Cohen and Felson claim that they the 
recently unemployed will tend to draw on savings for a 
short period of time to perpetuate their old routines 
while first unemployed, without changing their behavior. 
If conditions while unemployed are favorable for 
committing crimes, individuals will commit crimes only 
after taking time to break routines. Routine activities 
theory thus suggests that there is a lagged effect of 
unemployment on crime.
Christenson and Thornberry (1984) point out 
that it is important to also consider reciprocal effects. 
As mentioned above, committing a crime can make it 
more difficult to procure employment in the future. This 
not only increases the expected cost of current crime, 
decreasing crime rates, but also leads to lagged effects 
of crime on employment. Without testing for reciprocal 
effects, conclusions assuming the changes in crime could 
occur before changes in employment are invalid.
Theory predicts that both the number of 
weeks worked and income should correlate negatively 
to the probability that an individual commits a crime. 
Routine activities theory predicts that this correlation 
should be lagged. It is important to separately test for 
reciprocal effects, as they influence the validity of the 
forward relationship between employment measures 
and crime.
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
By using longitudinal data, we can account 
for each individual’s characteristics by looking at the 
likelihood of committing a crime changes over time. The 
NLSY97 has longitudinal data for a many individuals that 
include self-reported crimes and information about 
employment. In order to simplify the analysis, only three 
types of crime are examined: destruction of property, 
theft both above and below 50 dollars, and assault. The 
survey question about assault focuses on fights, which 
are more likely to offer a financial benefit than other 
types of violent crime, such as murder or rape. As Land 
(1985) finds, purely violent crimes such as murder 
or rape respond differently to changes in economic 
variables than other types of crime, partly because 
these crimes usually offer a psychological benefit, rather 
than a financial one. As a result, no other violent crimes 
are analyzed.
Self-reported crime data tends to underestimate 
the number of crimes committed (Mosher, et. al, 2002). 
Minor offenses are particularly liable to being under-
reported; the inclusion of thefts below 50 dollars 
could skew the data. This problem is difficult to avoid 
for longitudinal data, as surveys rely on self-reported 
information.
When analyzing the chance of an individual 
committing a crime based on their current economic 
situation, the total number of crimes isn’t as relevant 
as whether or not a crime was committed at all. If 
conditions make crime favorable, individuals should 
commit crimes as long as they continue to offer a net 
benefit. As a result, we look solely at whether or not 
an individual committed a crime in the survey year. 
This leads to a binary dependent variable. Although 
subjects tend to underestimate the number of crimes 
committed, they are more likely to accurately answer 
binary questions about crime (Mosher, et. al, 2002).
Income per week is included to take into 
account the potential opportunity cost of time in 
prison, as well as the lower relative benefit from 
committing crimes. Both effects should lead to a negative 
correlation between income and crime. The amount 
of employment is measured by the number of weeks 
worked each year. This doesn’t discriminate between 
full-time and part-time workers. However, the amount 
of work per week is reflected in weekly income. These 
variables collectively represent employment.
Several other variables can also impact crime 
rates and are important to control for. As many authors 
have shown (Shelley, 1981), age has a strong negative 
impact on crime rates, an effect that is separate from 
correlations between age and other variables. Because 
age is known to have non-linear effects on crime (Shelley, 
1981), age squared is included as well. Education is 
also measured. The subject’s highest degree is used to 
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measure education, even if the survey year is before the 
subject obtained the degree. In these cases, the highest 
degree variable serves as a proxy for educational 
achievement, ranging from a high school education to a 
PhD, omitting the case of no high school or high school 
equivalent degree.
Because the dependent variable is a binary 
variable, a logistic regression model is used. The 
relationship is assumed to be multiplicative, as in 
Equation 1.
P = Emp*Income*ß
Here, P represents the odds of an individual 
committing a crime, Emp is the number of weeks 
employed and Income is income per week. The 
variable ß represents the product of other factors. 
Taking the logarithm, the following regression equation 
is created, Equation 2.
ln P = a _0+ a_1 ln Emp+ a_2 ln Income+ a_3 Age  
+ a_4 Age^2+ a_4 Female+ ∑i yk HighestDegreei
Here, the ak represent the coefficients for the different 
variables. The ykrepresents the coefficients for the 
collection of education dummy variables Highest 
Degreei.
 The logarithmic nature of Equation 2 makes 
the equation focus on the multiplicative assumption in 
Equation 1, which is equivalent to the assumption that 
the equation is linear in the proportional changes of the 
variables. This suggests that Equation 2 measures the 
individuals’ responses to changes in variables. As a result, 
dummy variables are unnecessary for each individual in 
Equation 2.
Some survey questions are phrased in terms of 
the calendar year before the interview, while others are 
based on the duration since the last interview. Subjects 
who missed survey years are likely to report data 
with different scopes, making the data meaningless. In 
order to avoid these errors, all missing years and cases 
following missing years are excluded from the analysis. 
In order to measure the lagged effect of 
employment variables on crime, another regression 
is run. According to the routine activities theory 
mentioned above, there should be a lagged effect of 
income and weeks worked on crime. As Thornberry and 
Christenson mention (1984), there are also reciprocal 
effects to consider. However, using unlagged crime rate 
variables to test such effects is mathematically a re-
arrangement of the regression in Equation 2. In order 
to measure the reciprocal effects, regressions are run 
to measure the impact of crime on future economic 
variables by lagging the crime variable. Equation 3 
shows the regression equation for the number of weeks 
worked.
WeeksWorked=[(a+ß)]_0 LagCrimeInYear+ß_1 
Age+ß_2 Age^2+ß_3 Income+
ß_4 Gender+ ∑_iy_i HighestDegree_i+ß_5 
LagWeeksWorked
 These regressions are simple linear regressions. They 
are run for both the length of employment and weekly 
income. The other variables are included for the same 
reason as in the first set of regressions. Income and 
WeeksWorked are lagged in their own regressions, and 
unlagged in the others. Including a lagged dependent 
variable as an independent variable for time-series 
data reduces autocorrelation. Along with variables like 
education and age, income can be seen as a measure 
of productivity, which influences the length an individual, 
is hired. If productivity is taken to explain the length of 
employment, then the length of employment cannot be 
used in the regression for productivity, as it gives no new 
information. Equation 4 shows the income regression.
Income=[(a+ß)]_0 LagCrimeInYear+ß_1 Age+ß_2 
Age^2+ß_3 Gender+
∑_i y_i HighestDegree_i+ß_4 LagIncome
 Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics for the data. The 
ages range from 13 to 30, with every subject within a 
couple years of the same age. For both WeeksWorked 
and income earned, the means are decreased by the 
number of cases with no reported employment.
IV. RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results of the unlagged 
crime regression. The coefficients are the log odds 
ratios for each independent variable. As expected, both 
the number of weeks worked and employment show 
a significant negative relationship with the likelihood of 
committing a crime. Because the regression is run in log 
terms, the magnitudes of the coefficients represent the 
powers of the terms multiplied. More importantly, the 
significance of the coefficients points to a multiplicative 
relationship between these independent variables 
and crime rates. To interpret the log odds ratio, the 
coefficient is exponentiated, yielding the odds ratio, 
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which is then converted to a probability.
The odds ratio for number of WeeksWorked 
means that for an increase by a factor of e in the number 
of weeks worked, the odds of committing a crime 
decrease by 10 percent, meaning that the individual 
is 2.4 percent less likely to commit a crime. Similarly, 
when income increases by a factor of e, the individual’s 
chance of committing a crime decreases by around 
2.2 percent compared to even odds. This comparison 
to even odds represents the exponentiation of the 
odds ratio mentioned earlier. However, the change 
in probability for a given change in odds is nonlinear, 
and so the comparison to even odds serves only as an 
illustrative tool.
Because there is a finite number of weeks 
in a year, there is a limit to how low weeks worked 
can decrease the odds ratio for committing a crime. 
Compared to an identical individual with no employment 
in a year, an individual with 52 weeks worked will be 
around 10 percent less likely to commit a crime. Given 
the cost required to employ someone throughout the 
year, this is a relatively small decrease in crime rates.
The education dummy variables are generally 
as expected, with more education leading to lower 
crime, with two exceptions. The variables range from a 
GED, the first case, to a professional degree, the seventh 
case, which omits the case of no GED and no high 
school. Subjects with a PhD and subjects with a GED 
show a higher chance of committing a crime than those 
without degrees, which contradicts the hypothesis that 
education leads to higher crime. The result for doctorates 
is small and very insignificant, which makes sense given 
that there are very few individuals in the study with a 
highest degree of a PhD. However, the results for GEDs 
are significant to the .05 level. There are many possible 
explanations for this: individuals who took the time to 
get a GED could be the same individuals who are more 
willing to take risks for economic gain, for instance. For 
the other education levels, the results make sense: as 
education level rises, the chance of committing crime 
drops.
The age results also support Shelley’s empirical 
findings (1981). As discussed above, age should have 
a negative, but diminishing, effect on crime rates. The 
results show a strong negative impact of age on crime; 
however, age squared shows a slight, but significant, 
positive correlation with the chance of committing 
crime. This nonlinear term, although small, significantly 
reduces the marginal effect of age for the ranges of ages 
in the study. Theoretically, the turning point at which the 
nonlinear effects dominate and higher age leads to more 
crime is around 26 with the data given. However, this is 
unreliable simply because of the limited age range of the 
study. With a highest age of 30, there are too few points 
above the age of 26 to make a claim about a turning 
point; however, it is notable that a turning point was 
seen at all, and gives opportunity for further analysis 
with larger data sets.
Gender also has a significant coefficient, showing 
that women are less likely to commit crimes. Compared 
to even odds, the probability of committing a crime 
decreases by more than .13 for women, an effect that 
supports other criminological research (Shelley, 1981).
Table 3 contains the regression results for the 
model with only lagged employment variables included. 
Most of the coefficients are similar to those obtained 
from the first regression. However, the lagged income 
and lagged number of WeeksWorked variables both 
correlate positively to crime. As mentioned by Shelley 
(1981) and Cohen and Felson (1979), this could be 
because individuals compare their current position to 
past positions, and once an individual has been more 
successful, they are willing to take greater risks to 
continue their success.
Table 4 summarizes the regression with both 
the lagged and non-lagged cases. The same patterns 
seen earlier are seen here as well. The impact of age on 
crime is much larger, while the coefficient for gender is 
smaller.
Compared to the first and second regressions, 
the coefficients for the employment variables are greater 
in magnitude. This can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
The positive sign of the lagged variables suggests that to 
a certain extent, the amount that an individual’s income 
or employment has improved within a year plays a role 
in determining when to commit crime.
The results for the reciprocal effects are 
summarized in Tables 5 and 6. For the regression with 
only lagged crime rate, we see that most coefficients 
have the expected sign. As expected, as age increases the 
number of weeks worked increases as well. Diminishing 
returns for age suggest that age squared should reduce 
the impact of age, with a coefficient with the opposite 
sign. Age squared here has a slight but significant negative 
effect, as expected. The education dummy variables all 
have positive effects, but interestingly, higher education 
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has less of a positive impact than an associate degree 
or junior college.
As can be seen, lagged crime rates have a 
negative impact on the number of weeks worked. 
However, this effect is both small, and statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that crime does not have a 
strong lagged effect on employment.
Table 6 summarizes the results for the income 
regression. For income per week, crime has an even 
smaller, statistically insignificant effect. The same is true 
for unlagged crime: the effect is relatively small and 
insignificant. This suggests that the result obtained by 
Thornberry needs to be revisited, as the effects of 
crime on employment and wages are small.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As expected, employment correlates negatively 
to crime. Assuming that this relationship is a causal 
relationship, this suggests that increasing employment 
leads to lower crime rates. Because the relationship is 
logarithmic, the effect has diminishing marginal returns, 
meaning that increasing employment is most effective 
for individuals who are unemployed or have little 
employment. The same is true for income.
The results support Becker’s rational choice 
theory. However, for the lagged variables, the effect is 
positive, and fails to show evidence for routine activities 
theory, which claims that Becker’s predicted negative 
effect would be lagged. The positive effect observed is 
statistically significant. Moreover, the effect’s magnitude 
increases when the unlagged variables are included as 
well, suggesting that, to a certain degree, the difference 
between current and past employment status is an 
important determinant of crime. This could be because 
of the importance of comparison for individuals: the 
routine activities theory describes a necessary lag in 
time for routines to be broken, but, rather than the 
change of routine, the change in lifestyle necessitated by 
changes in employment may be more relevant.
For the reciprocal effects described by 
Thornberry (1984), the results are mixed. The effects of 
crime on the number of weeks worked and on weekly 
income are both small and statistically insignificant. This 
suggests that the relationship is more complex than the 
description of either routine activities theory or the 
reciprocal effect theory.
Shelley (1981) mentions that given the 
complexity of the causes of crime, it is impossible to 
come up with coherent prediction. However, Becker’s 
rational choice theory remains well supported by the 
evidence, which justifies its continued use (Levitt and 
Miles, 2006) in analyzing crime.
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VII. APPENDIX
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
AnyCrimesinYear 0 1 .19 .389
WeeksWorked 0 60 24.84 21.035
IncomePerWeek 0.00 44091.00 223.6962 814.42017
HighestDegree 0 7 2.21 1.375
Gender 1 2 1.47 .499
Table 2: Unlagged Employment
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
LnWeeksWorked -.159 .025 39.649 1 .000 .853
LnIncomePerWeek -.063 .016 14.608 1 .000 .939
HighestDegree 140.047 7 .000
HighestDegree(1) .196 .075 6.735 1 .009 1.216
HighestDegree(2) -.165 .065 6.344 1 .012 .848
HighestDegree(3) -.180 .089 4.065 1 .044 .835
HighestDegree(4) -.468 .073 41.508 1 .000 .626
HighestDegree(5) -.540 .117 21.127 1 .000 .583
HighestDegree(6) .059 .389 .023 1 .879 1.061
HighestDegree(7) -.728 .229 10.089 1 .001 .483
Age -.744 .062 144.518 1 .000 .475
Gender(1) -.470 .038 156.780 1 .000 .625
AgeSquared .014 .001 94.939 1 .000 1.014
CrimeLastYear 1.414 .038 1361.635 1 .000 4.111
Constant 8.400 .615 186.763 1 .000 4445.093
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LnWeeksWorked, LnIncomePerWeek, HighestDegree, Age, Gender, 
AgeSquared, CrimesLastYear. 
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Table 3: Lagged Employment
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
LagLnWeeksWorked .180 .023 60.543 1 .000 1.198
LagLnIncomePerWeek .213 .013 254.126 1 .000 1.237
HighestDegree 154.125 7 .000
HighestDegree(1) .141 .075 3.559 1 .059 1.151
HighestDegree(2) -.284 .064 19.885 1 .000 .753
HighestDegree(3) -.365 .090 16.555 1 .000 .694
HighestDegree(4) -.522 .072 53.331 1 .000 .593
HighestDegree(5) -.737 .121 37.354 1 .000 .478
HighestDegree(6) -.355 .475 .559 1 .455 .701
HighestDegree(7) -.638 .221 8.365 1 .004 .528
Age -1.084 .054 403.658 1 .000 .338
Gender(1) -.373 .038 97.190 1 .000 .689
AgeSquared .020 .001 228.190 1 .000 1.020
CrimeLastYear 1.688 .043 1561.462 1 .000 5.411
Constant 10.326 .578 319.232 1 .000 30524.587
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LagLnWeeksWorked, LagLnIncomePerWeek, HighestDegree, Age, 
Gender, AgeSquared, CrimeLastYear.
Table 4: Unlagged and Lagged Employment
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
LagLnWeeeksWorked .259 .036 52.845 1 .000 1.296
LagLnIncomePerWeek .261 .020 173.035 1 .000 1.298
LnWeeksWorked -.300 .039 60.439 1 .000 .741
LnIncomePerWeek -.186 .025 53.755 1 .000 .830
HighestDegree 85.394 7 .000
HighestDegree(1) .002 .106 .000 1 .985 1.002
HighestDegree(2) -.377 .091 17.180 1 .000 .686
HighestDegree(3) -.496 .122 16.540 1 .000 .609
HighestDegree(4) -.602 .099 36.586 1 .000 .548
HighestDegree(5) -.755 .156 23.561 1 .000 .470
HighestDegree(6) -.587 .578 1.031 1 .310 .556
HighestDegree(7) -1.136 .311 13.325 1 .000 .321
Age -.970 .088 121.764 1 .000 .379
Gender(1) -.355 .051 48.502 1 .000 .701
AgeSquared .018 .002 81.550 1 .000 1.018
CrimeLastYear 1.742 .053 1096.264 1 .000 5.710
Constant 10.327 .904 130.507 1 .000 30551.427
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LagLnWeeksWorked, LagLnIncomePerWeek, LnWeeksWorked, LnIn-
comePerWeek, HighestDegree, Age, Gender, AgeSquared, CrimeLastYear.
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Table 5
Model Unstandardized
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) -69.281 2.500 -27.715 .000
CrimeLastYear -.257 .190 -.006 -1.351 .177
AgeSquared -.148 .005 -1.325 -27.898 .000
IncomePerWeek -.003 .000 -.140 -32.567 .000
Age 7.763 .233 1.593 33.386 .000
KEY!SEX(SYMBOL)1997 -.288 .145 -.008 -1.992 .046
GED 1.218 .297 .024 4.106 .000
High School 4.826 .248 .142 19.422 .000
Associate/Junior College 6.348 .355 .094 17.875 .000
Bachelor’s 4.719 .277 .112 17.064 .000
Master’s 4.110 .441 .045 9.322 .000
PhD 2.060 1.923 .004 1.072 .284
Professional Degree 1.028 .844 .005 1.218 .223
LagWeeksWorked .175 .003 .278 62.440 .000
a. Dependent Variable: Weeks Worked
Table 6
Model Unstandardized
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) -837.039 146.285 -5.722 .000
CrimeLastYear -2.329 11.394 -.001 -.204 .838
AgeSquared -.084 .306 -.015 -.273 .785
WeeksWorked -8.097 .266 -.157 -30.497 .000
Age 68.495 13.539 .282 5.059 .000
KEY!SEX(SYMBOL)1997 -68.853 8.368 -.041 -8.228 .000
GED 46.472 17.255 .019 2.693 .007
High School 106.984 14.594 .064 7.331 .000
Associate/Junior College 156.113 20.653 .047 7.559 .000
Bachelor’s 99.585 16.192 .048 6.150 .000
Master’s 68.071 25.593 .015 2.660 .008
PhD 91.678 107.206 .004 .855 .392
Professional Degree 16.854 49.480 .002 .341 .733
LagIncomePerWeek .047 .005 .043 8.592 .000
a. Dependent Variable: IncomePerWeek
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